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„The Impact of Blockchain Technology on the Trustworthiness of Online Voting 
Systems – An Exploration of Blockchain-Enabled Online Voting “ 
Abstract 
Online Voting evidently increases election turnouts. However, recent state-owned initiatives 
have failed due to security concerns and a lack of trust in the systems. Blockchain seems to be 
a very suitable technical solution to establish transparency in online voting and thus, create 
trust. We have built our own, blockchain-enabled voting platform and utilized it to run an A/B-
testing experiment at an university election to investigate its effect. Our results which show that 
students trusted the blockchain-based voting version less than the control version can be found 
in Vysna (2020). The following discussion can be found in Konzok (2020). 
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According to Russell and Zamifir (2018), participation rates in parliamentary elections dropped 
by more than 10% globally between 1980 and 2018. To take countermeasures against this trend, 
online voting turned out to be a promising idea. Breux et al. (2017) found evidence that online 
voting actually increases election turnouts by especially encouraging less committed voters. 
Unfortunately, various, state-run initiatives to implement online voting have failed. The 
Netherlands forbade electronic counting of votes due to a strong fear of cyberattacks (Lowe, 
2019) and France stopped all ongoing initiatives because of similar motivations (Reuters, 
2018). The only exception remains Estonia, which already enabled online voting in 
parliamentary elections since 2005. In 2019, for the first time in history, it became the most 
popular channel to cast a vote with 44% of all participating voters using it (Krivonosova, 2019). 
However, what seems to be missing to expand the implementation of online voting 
systems is the right technology. Both, the responsible authorities and the broad population have 
to trust their voting system to enable a successful transformation. Spycher et al. (2011) 
identified transparency as the most crucial factor for establishing trust in online voting systems. 
In achieving this, Dogo et al. (2018) stress that blockchain technology establishes strong 
perceived transparency. Our implied research hypothesis therefore states that introducing 
blockchain technology to online voting system does actually increase the trust in this system. 
This hypothesis turns into our research question: To what extent the use of blockchain 
technology actually impacts the trustworthiness of online voting systems? 
With the goal of investigating the answer, we built our own, blockchain-based online 
voting system, called Votechain, to run an expedient experiment. It technically works on a 
blockchain protocol and enables voters to cast their ballot online and verify it afterwards. 
Hereby, the voters are given access to the entire blockchain of the particular election they are 
participating in, in an encrypted manner. Each block represents one vote.  
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Votechain has been utilized in a students’ elections encompassing almost 1000 votes out 
of which roughly every second student actively participated in our A/B-Testing experiment. 
The main goal of this experiment was to investigate, whether students who were prompted with 
a visualization of the election blockchain after they cast their vote would actually trust this 
online voting system more than the control group, to which state-of-the-art security methods 
were shown instead. 
Our research paper starts off with an extensive literature review including an elaboration 
about the nature of elections, voting methods and the transition to online voting (Vysna, 2020), 
blockchain technology (Konzok, 2020) and blockchain-based voting (included in this paper). 
Thereafter, we describe Votechain and our experiment in the methods. The results and an 
adequate statistical analysis of our experiment can be found in Vysna (2020) and the following 
discussion is written down in Konzok (2020). 
Individual Contribution 
The literature review is split into three sections and represents the individual contributions to 
the master thesis of all of the team members. Nina Vysna created the first section — Elections 
and trust — and Ivo Konzok developed the second — An exploration of blockchain technology 
— which they submitted individually. The third section — Blockchain-enabled online voting 
— is written by Kevin Riedlberger and is part of the overall submission in this document. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Blockchain-enabled online voting 
The other two literature review parts of Vysna (2020) and Konzok (2020) reflected on 
democratic elections in general and the blockchain technology. This part combines both of them 
and describes blockchain-enabled online voting systems. First, we compare traditional voting 
methods and online voting solutions in order to identify barriers that have prevented a large-
scale adoption of the technology. Second, we examine what blockchain technology might offer 
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to improve online voting systems. Third, several existing blockchain-enabled voting solutions 
are compared and contrasted. Ways in which these existing solutions are meeting election 
requirements will be explored individually. Fourth, we conclude why trust might be the crucial 
factor to assess the potential of blockchain-enabled voting systems and present our research 
hypothesis. 
2.1.1 Comparison of traditional and online voting systems 
For the following comparison the term traditional voting schemes refers to the paper ballot 
system because it reflects the current European standard (Russell and Zamfir, 2018). 
First, a fundamentally important requirement for elections is accuracy of the vote count. 
While analysing different vote counting methods for traditional voting schemes, Goggin et al. 
(2012) observed a human error between approximately one and two percent. Causes of these 
errors include miscounting or misattributing votes due to poor handwriting. In contrast, 
electronic voting systems are based on a programmed logic, which prevents these problems 
(Willemson, 2017). However, a tampered voting machine may produce different results than 
an untampered machine while using the exact same input. The condition of dispute freeness 
stated by F.M.Mursi et al. (2013) is therefore in jeopardy for both of the two systems since both 
bear the risk of creating disputes (Willemson, 2017). 
A second point of comparison is eligibility, which traditional voting schemes achieve by 
in-person authentication, often by providing identification (Paul et al., 2003). Online systems 
can either issue machine-readable identification cards or distribute unique identifiers to every 
voter via a secure channel like the postal system (Hill, 2016). In order to prevent voters from 
sharing their identification information with others, credentials can be substituted by biometric 
authentication techniques like fingerprints or iris scans, which are already in use in several 
African countries (Russell and Zamfir, 2018).  
Third, privacy is a mandatory requirement in most democratic countries. It is satisfied by 
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paper ballot voting because authentication and voting are separated processes, guaranteeing an 
anonymous vote while fulfilling the eligibility specification (Cuvelier et al., 2013). Internet 
voting schemes use encryption technology to provide privacy to its users (Hill, 2016). 
Hjálmarsson and Hreiðarsson (2018) presented one such method called the Zero-Knowledge 
Proof, which has become one of the most popular encryption methods for electronic voting 
systems. Closely connected to the privacy requirement is verifiability which can be further 
divided into universal and individual verifiability, as described in Vysna (2020). Achieving 
privacy and verifiability simultaneously is difficult since they tend to be mutually exclusive. 
While privacy requires the total separation between voter identity and the casted vote, 
verifiability needs to connect them (Jonker et al., 2013). Regarding paper ballot voting, both 
verifiability properties are practically unattainable in the majority of cases. Putting the vote into 
the ballot box, solely provides privacy and leaves the voter with trust in the central authority 
that the vote gets counted correctly (Cuvelier et al., 2013). Online voting schemes offer multiple 
solutions for both verifiability properties which are also able to provide their voters privacy, as 
can be seen in the research of Hill (2016). 
A major challenge of the transition from traditional to internet voting schemes is to ensure 
uncoercibility which Krivoruchko (2007) describes as the ability to protect voters from any 
influence by coercers. Conventional voting booths can prevent coercion by having individuals 
vote privately. While not a perfect system — for example, individuals can still be threatened or 
blackmailed to vote a certain way — private voting booths are an effective countermeasure 
against coercion. As soon as the voting itself is carried out remotely, coercion becomes a serious 
threat because attackers are able to extend their reach and data collection opportunities (Juels 
et al., 2010). Also established methods like postal voting leave the voter vulnerable to coercible 
approaches from others (Hill, 2016). As any remote voting scheme, online voting systems bear 
the same risk and cannot provide the same protection against coercion as private voting booths 
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in polling stations (Valenty and Brent, 2000). But some of the online systems provide methods 
to counteract coercion. For example, the Estonian online voting solution allows their citizens 
to vote an unlimited amount of times, overturning the earlier votes each time (Russell and 
Zamfir, 2018). As a result, Estonian voters can alter an earlier, coerced vote. In summary, online 
voting systems actually comply with five out of six of the regarded criteria whereas, by this 
framework, traditional systems actually lack three out of six. The only requirement not fulfilled 
by online voting systems is dispute freeness which is not fulfilled by traditional systems either. 
The primary reason for the hesitant implementation of online voting systems is prevalent 
security concerns. Policymakers and voters fear the systematic fraud. Specifically, concerns 
surround being electronically spied on, or voters being tampered with by hackers (Susskind, 
2017). 
Apart from the conducted comparison regarding election requirements, online voting 
systems might contain the potential to lower costs and improve voter turnout. While analysing 
the Estonian internet voting system, Krimmer et al. (2018) calculated cost savings of 
approximately 50% compared to the second cheapest option of the election, represented by 
traditional polling stations. The effect on turnout is more difficult to determine. While Sál 
(2015) concluded that the online system was accepted rapidly by the majority of the Estonian 
population and increased turnout slightly, similar research of Germann and Serdült (2017) 
showed that the implementation of internet voting in Switzerland for referendums did not 
increase voter turnout. The latter study stressed that the effect on turnout is dependent on the 
existing voting infrastructure, since Switzerland had a well-established postal voting system in 
place which offered its citizens to vote remotely even before the internet voting alternative. 
2.1.2 Why blockchain technology might improve current online voting systems 
One subset of internet voting systems is blockchain-based voting technology. In order to justify 
the potential of a blockchain-based system for hosting elections, it should meet the standards 
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of existing online voting systems while providing further improvements, specifically regarding 
security (Wolf et al., 2011), trustworthiness and transparency. As described in Vysna (2020), 
Moynihan (2004), F.M.Mursi et al. (2013) and Gritzalis (2012) identify a collection of flaws in 
currently used voting schemes including tampering, residual votes, errors of optical scanners 
and machines in general. Considering these issues, blockchain technology provides 
immutability, durability and “eliminates single points of failure” (Abeyratne and Monfared, 
2016, p.3). In regular online voting systems, such single points of failure are represented by 
their centrally controlled database. Since a successful cyberattack would result in a large data 
loss, the public is forced to trust the central authority to keep the records accurate (Lewis et al., 
2017). Blockchain decentralizes the database across its network. Utilizing the consensus 
protocols, explained in chapter two, this enables everyone to verify the correctness of the count 
and ensures that no data has been altered, deleted or entered without authorization 
(Hanifatunnisa and Rahardjo, 2017). In order to remove blockchain’s integrity, malicious 
attackers would have to own a majority of nodes as explained by Tosh et al. (2017). Since the 
blockchain protocol is open-source, the voters can be certain that the system runs as intended 
based on its source code (Abeyratne and Monfared, 2016). While bearing the risk that potential 
vulnerabilities of such a system can be exposed, providing the code as open source also enables 
the public to find solutions and improvements for security problems (Volkamer et al., 2011). 
Thus, dispute freeness can also be achieved, which lets blockchain-based election systems 
fulfill all aforementioned criteria. Combining all those features, blockchain technology is able 
to provide online voting systems a high level of transparency regarding the electoral process 
which is necessary for a healthy democracy (Susskind, 2017). 
2.1.3 Existing concepts of blockchain-enabled voting systems 
After exploring the potential of blockchain technology for electoral systems, this section 
introduces existing blockchain-based election systems, created by different corporations. 
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Highlighted here are unsolved challenges, presented by analysing how each corporation’s 
technology performs according to the aforementioned, predetermined election requirements. 
2.1.3.1 Overview of current blockchain-based voting applications 
Cucurull et al. (2019) summarized seven well-known online voting applications which are using 
blockchain technology. Due to the limited publicly available information about those 
applications, their websites and white papers are the only resources in most cases. Hayes (2019) 
defined a white paper as an “...informational document, usually issued by a company or not-
for-profit organization, to promote or highlight the features of a solution, product, or service”. 
When using them as a source of information about a technology, it should be mentioned that 
they are often used as a marketing tool and thus, highlight the positive aspects of each 
application. Appendix 1 presents a detailed overview of the seven applications, analysed by 
Cucurull et al. (2019) and compares their individual blockchain infrastructure, encryption 
technology, unique features, business model and funding. 
While the applications differ significantly from each other in many aspects, they are 
united by the attempt to “provide verifiable integrity while minimizing privacy loss” (Bernhard 
et al., 2017, p.88), using blockchain technology. The majority of applications focus on large-
scale projects, which are ordered on-demand by customers like universities, organizations, local 
and national governments. Besides paying the firms directly for carrying elections out utilizing 
their applications, clients can also purchase each company’s tokens which are publicly traded 
on cryptocurrency exchanges such as binance.com. These tokens get distributed to the voters 
and have to be spent in order to authenticate users or cast ballots during the election. Out of the 
four businesses (FollowMyVote, Votem, Agora and Horizon Sate) basing their system on 
tokens, only Agora’s VOTE (Binance, n.d.) and Horizon State’s Decision Token 
(CoinMarketCap, n.d.) can currently be purchased and are traded publicly. It should be 
mentioned, however, that Horizon State closed for business on August 19th, 2019 due to a 
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lawsuit. This again illustrates the unpredictability of the yet immature cryptocurrency-based 
market (Campbell, 2019).  
The investments of venture capitalists into companies building on blockchain technology 
have been increasing (CB Insights, 2018) and firms like Medici Ventures start to focus solely 
on funding such startups, for example Voatz and Votem (Medici, n.d.). Regarding successful 
real-life experiments, the majority of the systems have already supported numerous elections 
of several customers varying from universities, municipals, companies, conferences, labor 
unions and governments. These successful real-life experiments ranging between a couple of 
hundred votes, up to 1.8 million votes (Votem, 2017a), along with the increasing amount of 
investments in these systems, show that there is a general interest in blockchain-based voting 
schemes from the public. 
2.1.3.2 The effectiveness of current blockchain voting systems 
The presented voting applications show a high diversity in their approaches to build a secure 
voting system. Cucurull et al. (2019) analysed the extent to which they meet international 
standards, specifically the recommendations of the Council of Europe from 2017 (Committee 
of Ministers, 2017). The authors added a set of requirements, which are stressed Vysna (2020) 
and chapter 2.1.1. These are accuracy (vote correctness), eligibility, privacy, integrity, 
authentication, verifiability and uncoercibility. Moreover, the authors included long-term 
privacy and scalability. Table 3 provides a summary of this comparison. 
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Table 1: Properties of selected blockchain-based voting systems (Cucurull et al., 2019, p.309) 
 
Starting with accuracy or correctness, Cucurull et al. (2019) used a different definition, solely 
focusing on providing the user feedback if there is an error casting their vote. We will base our 
analysis on the definition given by Lambrinoudakis et al. (2003) which is used in Vysna (2020) 
for the sake of continuity within this project. They define an election as accurate if all valid 
votes are included in the final count and cannot be changed by anyone. According to chapter 
2.1.1, all electronic voting systems are fulfilling the accuracy requirement. Eligibility, 
authentication and privacy which Cucurull et al. (2019) calls anonymity are provided by all the 
applications, as well as integrity which is fulfilled by blockchain technology by default 
(Abeyratne and Monfared, 2016). The verifiability requirement is redefined for end-to-end 
online voting systems into three parts, namely cast as intended, recorded as cast and tallied as 
recorded. Thus, voters can verify if their ballots were marked correctly, recorded correctly and 
if the overall voting result is correct (Wu, 2018). Due to a lack of information provided by the 
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companies running the regarded applications, the analysis for verifiability is not complete but 
the overall accessible information suggests that the applications are satisfying the verifiability 
requirements (Cucurull et al., 2019). Finally, reviewing the individual white papers of the 
applications leads to the conclusion that besides SecureVote, none of the systems addresses 
coercion. SecureVote is offering its users the possibility to generate a receipt of a fake vote 
which makes it impossible for a third party to identify if the receipt the voter has shown is 
correct or fake (Cucurull et al., 2019). 
In addition, Cucurull et al. (2019) reviewed two more properties, namely long-term 
privacy and scalability, which are specifically important for blockchain-based voting schemes. 
Long-term privacy refers to the application’s ability to disconnect voter identities from their 
casted votes in the long-term. This sense of anonymity is in most of the regarded applications 
secured by combining key-sharing schemes and encryption. Underlying current computational 
power benchmarks, this principle works reliably, however, future improvements of 
computational power could jeopardize these encryption algorithms and expose voter identities. 
Regarding the seven applications, only FollowMyVote claims to use a technique to ensure voter 
privacy which works independently of the level of computational power and thus, provides 
robust long-term privacy. Secondly, the scalability of applications is taken into consideration. 
Bitcoin (seven transactions per second) and Ethereum (20 transactions per second) lack a 
sufficiently high level of scalability, as it is explained Konzok (2020) (Chauhan et al., 2018). 
As a result, FollowMyVote and Horizon State, being based on these two blockchains 
respectively, fail to qualify for running high level elections (Cucurull et al., 2019). The other 
systems fulfill the requirement because their systems either work on scalable, private or 
permissioned blockchains or develop their own sophisticated hybrid like SecureVote. In the 
latter option, this hybrid stacks the collected votes into immutable and digital pallets before 
sending them to the blockchain. Thus, the number of transactions is reduced which ultimately 
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provides a high level of scalability.  
In conclusion, existing blockchain-based online voting systems fulfill the majority of 
technical properties but are not yet considered to be mature enough for large-scale adoption. 
2.1.4 Trust as a deciding factor and our research question 
People’s trust in the electoral integrity is fundamental for democratic elections, as it is discussed 
in Vysna (2020). Hence, the decision of whether to implement a new online voting system or 
not should not only be based on its technological properties but also on the public’s perception 
of it, since “a voting system is only as good as the public believe it to be” (Mc Galey and Paul 
Gibson, 2003, p.4). This is consistent with the findings of Vassil et al. (2016), where the authors 
identified that Estonian voters who trust in the internet voting system were more likely to vote 
online than people who considered it less trustworthy. Blockchain technology offers a 
promising alternative to increase electoral integrity by design. Instead of attempting to build 
more confidence in a central authority controlling the process, the blockchain substitutes trust 
with cryptographic proof (Nakamoto, 2008). Existing blockchain-enabled voting applications 
argue that this makes trust in electoral authorities obsolete. In exchange, it requires voters to 
put their trust into the procedure itself, which is completely transparent as it provides an 
auditable source code and the possibility of vote verification (Agora, 2015; Horizon State, 2017; 
Polys, 2017). The Council of Europe (2011) agrees that the key to build public trust in online 
voting systems, is to make the process transparent and to openly communicate the reasons for 
its introduction. At the same time, the Council questions if the public will be able to understand 
the technology. Boucher (2017) supports this concern by pointing out blockchain’s complexity 
as a possible barrier to general acceptance. Hill (2016) provides corresponding evidence for this 
claim since existing, sophisticated methods like Zero-Knowledge Proof or MixNet which solve 
specific online voting issues are still not implemented at larger scale due to a lack of 
understanding. Certain countries, such as Germany, even legally require that every voter has to 
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be able to observe, understand and verify the voting scheme, based on the latest German 
Constitutional Court decision in 2009 (Seedorf, 2016). Lacking the ability to distinguish 
between blockchain-enabled voting systems and regular internet voting solutions and to 
understand the advantages blockchain offers, could lead to the same trust issues the public has 
towards online voting mechanisms in general (Susskind, 2017). 
Although plenty of research has been conducted, addressing if blockchain technology can 
improve internet voting from a technical perspective, the question remains, whether voters 
consider blockchain-enabled voting applications more trustworthy than regular online voting 
systems. Therefore, the goal of this study is to empirically assess the difference in perceived 
trust of voters in the voting procedure between those who use a regular online voting system 
and those who vote on a blockchain-enabled solution. Based on the technical advantages 
blockchain offers regarding security and transparency, it is hypothesized that: 
Utilizing blockchain technology will lead to an increase of voter’s trust in online voting. 
Group Contribution 
The overall project was carried out by three students and is submitted individually which also 
includes the personal group contributions to the final document. Included in this part of the 
project is the methods section. The individual work of Nina Vysna — Elections and trust — 
contains the results section and Ivo Konzok’s work — An exploration of blockchain technology 
— contains the discussion section. 
3. Methods 
3.1 Experimental Design 
To test our hypothesis, we designed a randomized controlled trial experiment. Such an 
experiment entails randomly assigning the subjects in one of the two groups: 
experimental/treatment group that receives the tested intervention and control group that 
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receives alternative treatment. Afterwards, the two groups are surveyed in order to determine if 
there is a difference between them in the outcome and thus if the applied intervention had the 
desired effect (Kendall, 2003). 
In the context of websites and applications, such an experiment is also called A/B testing. 
A/B testing is a method that allows for comparing two versions of a website and evaluating 
which version performs better. In our case, version A, shown to the control group was a simple 
online election website with state-of-the-art two factor authentication and version B, shown to 
the experimental group was a blockchain enabled voting system in which voters were able to 
see every cast vote as a block in a blockchain. We alternated A and B version for each voter to 
achieve an approximately equal distribution of voters in each group. Section 3.2 describes the 
technical and design differences between the two versions in more detail and section 3.3 
explains further details of the experiment and the used measures.  
3.2 Description of the online voting system 
To execute the A/B testing and investigate how the use of blockchain technology influences the 
trustworthiness of online voting systems, we started by building our own, blockchain-based 
online voting application called Votechain. This application enabled us to run the experiment 
while deploying it on the Students Representative Election for the Pedagogical Council on the 
13th of November 2019 at Nova School of Business and Economics. The election consists of 
five sub-elections, one for PhD students (95), three for different master’s degrees (1638) and 
one for bachelor students (1394), which contains a total of 3129 eligible student voters. 
Following up on pursuing an open-source approach, we developed the application’s backend in 
Python and connected it to a PostgreSQL database. Python enabled us to leverage already 
existing third-party modules, especially regarding all functionalities directly related to the 
blockchain. PostgreSQL provided advanced query optimization and locking mechanisms which 
made sure the blockchain did not fork over the course of the election. To deploy Votechain, we 
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used the Flask web framework due to its high flexibility and speed. For a more detailed look at 
the backend processes, please have a look at appendix 2 or find the whole source code of the 
application in our GitHub repository, linked in appendix 3. According to Iansati and Lakhani 
(2017), blockchain-based applications should have the same standard of practicality and 
functionality as existing applications they try to replace. Therefore, our web design approach 
aimed at creating a very simplistic and intuitive voting experience for the user which is 
illustrated in appendix 4. The whole process of Votechain is explained in the following. 
Prior to the elections, all students were informed about the online voting system and 
received its URL which guided them to the website. Before entering the actual voting 
procedure, the first step on the website required the users to successfully authorize themselves. 
Nova SBE uses Google’s Gmail service for all its student accounts which led us to integrate 
Google Sign-in. The API checked if the entered credentials are correct and identify a Nova SBE 
user. Importantly, this ensured only currently enrolled Nova SBE students could vote in the 
elections, avoiding any sample contamination. After a successful login, the application accessed 
the database and compared the credentials with the official white list. The admission was only 
allowed in case the user was eligible to vote in one of the published elections. 
Once the users completed the authorization, they were redirected to the first of two pages. 
Screenshots of the entire user experience can be found in appendix 5-7. First, users saw the 
voting page. The voting page displayed the corresponding election with respect to their program 
including all required information for each voter such as a short description of the election itself 
and their candidate lists. We used a step-by-step design approach to guide the user through the 
process in order to avoid any confusion. Each step contains a maximum of two sentences and 
requires only one interaction. Step one lets voters select their candidates list of choice and step 
two lets them submit it. To further minimize any issues like accidental selections, we 
implemented a third step where the users could see their selected list again and had to confirm 
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it before the vote was ultimately counted. Up until this point, every voter experienced exactly 
the same universal voting procedure. By confirming their vote, the users were redirected to the 
second page: the verification page. 
On the verification page, we introduced the A/B testing by creating two different versions 
of the page. Both versions followed the same step-by-step design as before and both were based 
on the same overall structure. The first step provided the users a randomly generated password 
which they were instructed to save on their local devices in order to verify their vote later on. 
The second step informed the voters briefly about the security features of the system and in the 
third step they were able to verify their vote. By entering the password, they received earlier, 
all relevant information about their cast vote was revealed. Eventually, step four redirected them 
to the survey. All functionalities of the verification page remained available during the entire 
time frame of the election and beyond. While consisting of the same parts, the two versions 
differed in their specific content within the first three steps. While version B clearly 
communicated and emphasized its underlying blockchain technology, version A represented a 
state of the art online-voting-system, which deliberately did not mention blockchain-related 











Table 2: Content differences between version A and version B of the online voting system 
 




The private key is called 
’Password’. 
The private key is called ‘Voter Key’. 
It is mentioned that the system is 




Emphasis of the integrated two-
factor-authentication method of 
the system and a brief explanation 
of it. This should provide a 
comparable sense of security for 
the users. It is repeatedly pointed 
out to store the password since the 
system will not store it to enhance 
privacy. 
Visualization of the entire blockchain 
and a brief explanation of its basic 
logic in the context of an election. The 
user is able to scroll through all 
numbered votes and their information 
(hash, previous hash, from address and 
timestamp). It is repeatedly pointed 
out to store the Voter Key since the 





The Private Key is called 
’Password’. If a user enters the 
private key correctly, the displayed 
vote contains the selected 
candidate list and timestamp as 
information. 
The Private Key is called ‘Voter Key’. 
If a user enters the private key 
correctly, the displayed vote contains 
the hash, previous hash, from address, 
to address, selected candidate list and 
timestamp as information. 
A more detailed explanation regarding the different components of a block can be found in 
appendix 8. Once the election was over, the blockchain additionally displayed the ‘to address’ 
of each vote. This was highly significant to the transparency of blockchain because it allowed 
voters to theoretically prove the public count by tallying the votes on their own. Note that this 
information was not visible to voters until after the election to fulfil the fairness property, 
described in chapter 2.1.1 (knowing the vote count of an ongoing election could influence the 
decision of voters). By the design of the experiment, the two versions displayed different 
information, but both offered the users the exact same functionalities. 
3.3 Survey 
3.3.1 Measures 
As mentioned above, the last step of the verification page was an invitation to fill in the survey 
that we used to measure the outcomes of the treatment. We used the survey software Qualtrics 
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to build and administer a web survey to collect data from undergraduate and graduate students 
at Nova SBE on the 13th of November, the day of the campus wide elections for next year’s 
Student Representatives. Students were notified about the upcoming elections a week prior to 
the election day, one day prior to the election day and three times on the election day itself. The 
elections were held solely via our web application; the paper ballot option used in previous 
years was eliminated.  
We chose the students of Nova SBE as our subjects because the mentioned elections that 
are held annually presented a unique opportunity to perform the trial with up to 3127 subjects 
and thus obtain large enough sample. 
Using an online survey enabled us to collect responses from our subjects right after they 
used the voting application, ensuring that the experience was easy to be recapitulated. As 
suggested by Dillman (2007), cash and non-cash incentives can increase the response rate of 
web-based surveys. Therefore, we encouraged subjects to fill in the survey by offering an 
incentive that one randomly drawn respondent would receive a dinner voucher for four people 
in a local restaurant.  
The questionnaire (reported in Appendix 9) consisted of 32 questions in total, with 25 
questions measuring trust on three different layers, five demographic questions regarding 
gender, age, race, nationality and university program the subjects were enrolled in, and two 
optional questions. The last two optional questions asked subjects to state their email address if 
they would have liked to be contacted, in case they won the prize. They were also able to 
indicate if they would like to participate in a focus group. 
Measures used in the questionnaire were adapted from the study by McKnight et al. 
(2011). These researchers developed and empirically tested constructs that measure trust in 
technology on three different levels. We were comfortable using these measures as the authors 
reported strong reliability (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.89), convergent validity and discriminant 
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validity. As opposed to other researchers who attempted to measure the same concept, they 
focused on trust in the technology itself rather than focusing on human traits found in 
technology. As suggested by Knight et al. (2011), this approach allows to determine “what is it 
about technology that makes the technology itself trustworthy, irrespective of the people and 
human structures that surround the technology” (p.2). However, they also argue that trust in 
technology is fairly similar to trust in people as trusting both people and technology involves 
risk, uncertainty and dependence on another. Therefore, they developed the measures for trust 
in technology as an analogy to already existing measures of trust in people. 
The survey is composed of three constructs that reflect the three levels of trust: a) 
propensity to trust general technology; b) institution-based trust in technology and c) trust in 
specific technology. These constructs consist of several sub-constructs as displayed in Figure 5 
below. The researchers found significant direct relationships between the sub-constructs 
belonging to the respective constructs. This signals that if one wants to fully understand the 
sources of trust in specific technology, it is useful to include propensity to trust general 
technology items and institutions-based trust items. Hence, we included all three constructs and 
thus seven sub-constructs each measured by three to four Likert scale items in the 
survey. Constructs’ scores are calculated as the averages of their subconstructs’ scores. 
Figure 1: Structural Model of Relations among Trust Constructs (McKnight et al. 2011, p.10) 
 
Propensity to trust in general technology is an individual's willingness to depend on technology 
across different situations and technologies. It is made up of two sub-constructs: a) faith in 
23 
 
general technology - an individual's beliefs about the reliability, functionality and helpfulness 
of information technologies in general and b) trusting stance - an individual's beliefs about a 
positive outcome stemming from relying on IT. Both sub-constructs are measured with three to 
four Likert scale items in the survey. 
Institution-based trust reflects the beliefs about the performance of a specific class of 
technologies in a particular context. It is composed of two sub-constructs: a) situational 
normality - a belief that using a specific class of technologies in a different way is perceived as 
normal within a certain context; and b) structural assurance - a belief that there is a necessary 
legal, contractual or physical support available for the class of technology that ensures the 
success of this technology. Each sub-construct is measured with four Likert-scale items in the 
survey. 
The most crucial construct for our research is trusting beliefs in a specific technology that 
“reflect beliefs that a specific technology has the attributes necessary to perform as expected in 
a given situation in which negative consequences are possible” (McKnight et al. 2011, p.5). 
This construct is reflected in three dimensions: a) reliability – belief that the technology will 
consistently operate properly, b) functionality - belief that the technology has the capability to 
complete a task and c) helpfulness - belief that the help function is adequate. Each of these 
dimensions is measured by three to four Likert scale items. According to the authors, the 
construct exists on a deeper level than its dimensions. In other words, trusting beliefs in a 
specific technology are not an aggregation of the beliefs about reliability, functionality and 
helpfulness. Rather, if one trusts a specific technology, this will be reflected in an increase in 
trusting beliefs regarding the three dimensions.  
The survey questions were formulated as similar as possible to the original measures. 
However, it was necessary to adapt them slightly to fit our research purpose. Trust in general 
technology construct remained unchanged. The class of technology questioned in the items 
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belonging to the institution-based trust construct has been changed to online voting systems. 
The specific technology mentioned in the items belonging to the trusting beliefs in specific 
technology construct was naturally our voting application, Votechain. 
3.3.2 Analysis 
The measures we adopted in the survey proved to be reliable; Cronbach’s alpha was above the 
recommended threshold of 0.70. Furthermore, principal component analysis verified that the 
items belonging to the same sub-construct correlate well with each other. After this initial 
analysis of the used measures that confirmed their suitability for our research, we assessed the 
sample for any demographic imbalances using a two-tailed t-test to compare the proportions of 
each demographic in the control and the treatment group. We found a significant imbalance in 
terms of gender and race (white and black in specific). Due to the imbalance, we were not able 
to perform a simple t-test to examine the difference in trust between the groups. Instead, we 
used multiple regression analysis and controlled for the imbalanced variables. 
The first model uses the mean scores for constructs and sub-constructs as dependent 
variables and gender and race as control variables. The key independent variable of interest is 
treatment which is equal to 0 if voter belongs to the control group and 1 if voter belongs to the 
treatment group. The regression model specification is given by: 
(1)	%&'()*+%) = 	-! +	-" ∙ 012341	 +	-# ∙ 543%6 +	-$ ∙ 3(73' +	-% ∙ &)ℎ1*	*3%1 +	-& ∙ )*13)21') + 	9 
where construct is the participant’s mean score for the items belonging to a construct or sub-
construct. In total, we ran this model 10 times: once for each of the seven sub-constructs 
(reliability, functionality, helpfulness, situational normality, structural assurance, faith in 
general technology and general stance towards technology), and once for each of the three 
constructs (trusting beliefs in specific technology, institution based trust and propensity to trust 
general technology).  
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We further developed three additional models that attempt to measure the added effect of 
some of the demographic variables on the constructs by adding interaction terms in our model. 
Specifically, we explored if gender (female, male), nationality (Portuguese, German, Italian, 
other), and the program (masters, bachelors, PhD.) have any additional effect (on top of the 
treatment) on the dependent variables. Since the sample was quite uniform in terms of race and 
age, we did not include the interaction variables that capture the added effect of these variables. 
In addition, we split the sample based on the voters’ mean score for the construct propensity to 
trust general technology into three groups: voters with high general technology trust (mean >= 
4.5), neutral general technology trust (3.5<mean<4.5) and low general technology trust 
(mean<3.5). Similarly, the sample was split based on the scores for institution-based trust. We 
included these variables in the models to verify the findings of McKnight et al. (2011) who 
found that propensity to trust in general technology sub-constructs have direct relationship with 
sub-constructs of institution based trust as well as trust in specific technology; and 
subconstructs of institution based trust have direct relationship with the trust in specific 
technology (as pictured in Figure 2).The second model is specified as follows: 
(2)	%&'()*+%) = -! +	-" ∙ 012341	 +	-# ∙ 543%6 +	-$ ∙ 3(73' +	-% ∙ &)ℎ1*	*3%1 +	-& ∙ ;1*23' + -' ∙ <)3473'	 +
	-( ∙ &)ℎ1*	'3)7&'347)= +	-) ∙ 53%ℎ14&*( +	-* ∙ >ℎ. @.+	-"! ∙ &)ℎ1*	A*&B*32 + -"" ∙ B1'. )1%ℎ. '1+)*34	 +	-"# ∙
B1'. )1%ℎ. 4&C +	-"$ ∙ 7'()7). )1%ℎ. '1+)*34 +	-"% ∙ 7'()7). )1%ℎ. 4&C +	-"& ∙ )*13)21') + -"' ∙ 012341 ∙
)*13)21') +	-"( ∙ ;1*23' ∙ )*13)21') + -") ∙ <)3473' ∙ )*13)21')	 +	-"* ∙ &)ℎ1*	'3)7&'347)= ∙ )*13)21') +
	-#! ∙ 53%ℎ14&*( ∙ )*13)21') +	-#" ∙ >ℎ. @.∙ )*13)21') +	-## ∙ &)ℎ1*	A*&B*32 ∙ )*13)21') + -#$ ∙
B1'. )1%ℎ. '1+)*34 ∙ )*13)21')	 +	-#% ∙ B1'. )1%ℎ. 4&C ∙ )*13)21') +	-#& ∙ 7'()7). )1%ℎ. '1+)*34 ∙ )*13)21') +
	-#' ∙ 7'()7). )1%ℎ. 4&C ∙ )*13)21') + 	9  
where construct represents the participants mean scores for the construct trusting beliefs in 
specific technology and its sub-constructs (reliability, functionality, helpfulness). We ran this 
model four times, once for each construct/sub-construct.  
The third model is specified by: 
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 (3)		%&'()*+%) = -! +	-" ∙ 012341	 +	-# ∙ 543%6 +	-$ ∙ 3(73' +	-% ∙ &)ℎ1*	*3%1 +	-& ∙ ;1*23' + -' ∙ <)3473'	 +
	-( ∙ &)ℎ1*	'3)7&'347)= +	-) ∙ 53%ℎ14&*( +	-* ∙ >ℎ. @.+	-"! ∙ &)ℎ1*	A*&B*32 + -"" ∙ B1'. )1%ℎ. '1+)*34	 +	-"# ∙
B1'. )1%ℎ. 4&C +	-"$ ∙ )*13)21') + -"% ∙ 012341 ∙ )*13)21') +	-"& ∙ ;1*23' ∙ )*13)21') + -"' ∙ <)3473' ∙
)*13)21')	 +	-"( ∙ &)ℎ1*	'3)7&'347)= ∙ )*13)21') +	-") ∙ 53%ℎ14&*( ∙ )*13)21') +	-"* ∙ >ℎ. @.∙ )*13)21') +
	-#! ∙ &)ℎ1*	A*&B*32 ∙ )*13)21') + -#" ∙ B1'. )1%ℎ. '1+)*34 ∙ )*13)21')	 +	-## ∙ B1'. )1%ℎ. 4&C ∙ )*13)21') + 	9 
in which construct is the participants mean score for the construct institution-based trust and its 
sub-constructs (situational normality, structural assurance). Variables low institutional trust and 
neutral institutional trust and their interactional terms with treatment variable are left out since 
institution-based trust is captured in the dependent variable in this model. We ran this model 
three times, once for each construct/sub-construct. 
Finally, the fourth model: 
(4)		%&'()*+%) = -! +	-" ∙ 012341	 +	-# ∙ 543%6 +	-$ ∙ 3(73' +	-% ∙ &)ℎ1*	*3%1 +	-& ∙ ;1*23' + -' ∙ <)3473'	 +
	-( ∙ &)ℎ1*	'3)7&'347)= +	-) ∙ 53%ℎ14&*( +	-* ∙ >ℎ. @.+	-"! ∙ &)ℎ1*	A*&B*32 +	-"& ∙ )*13)21') + -"' ∙ 012341 ∙
)*13)21') +	-& ∙ ;1*23' ∙ )*13)21') + -' ∙ <)3473' ∙ )*13)21')	 +	-( ∙ &)ℎ1*	'3)7&'347)= ∙ )*13)21') +	-) ∙
53%ℎ14&*( ∙ )*13)21') +	-* ∙ >ℎ. @.∙ )*13)21') +	-"! ∙ &)ℎ1*	A*&B*32 ∙ )*13)21') + 	9  
where construct is the participants mean score for the construct propensity to trust general 
technology and its sub-constructs (faith in general technology, stance towards general 
technology). Variables low general technology trust and neutral general technology trust and 
their interaction terms with treatment variable are left out since trust in general technology is 
captured in the dependent variable. Low institutional trust and neutral institutional trust 
variables and their interaction terms with treatment are also left out since, according to 
McKnight et al. (2011), propensity to trust technology in general technology has an impact on 
institution-based trust, rather than vice versa. 
3.4 Focus Group for gathering qualitative feedback 
In addition to the survey and its quantitative measurement of trust, we also decided to set up a 
focus group to gather qualitative feedback from users to elucidate our quantitative findings from 
the survey. More precisely, we intended to gain insights about voter’s general attitude towards 
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online elections, their knowledge about blockchain and their opinion about the provided system 
for the student representative elections in particular. Seven of the students who consented to 
participate in the survey were randomly selected to participate in the focus group. The date for 
the meeting was set to the following Monday (five days past the election) to ensure that the 
participants could still remember most details of their experience. The whole research team was 
present during the discussion. The team initiated the discussion and guided the participants 
through the protocol of six main questions. The attendees were encouraged to share their 
opinion with the group, to be critical and to discuss beyond the stated questions whenever they 
felt like a crucial argument was left out. After the focus group finished, the research team 
transcribed the recording. The complete transcription can be found in appendix 10. 
4. Conclusion 
Blockchain bears high potential to enhance the transparency of online voting systems and 
therefore increase their trustworthiness to drive adoption and higher election turnouts. We 
expected that our A/B-experiment would reveal higher levels of trust for blockchain-enabled 
voting in contrast to a two-factor-authentication security protocol, which we used for the control 
group of our experiment. Our results showed the opposite. Although only one of the seven sub-
constructs we applied to measure trust showed a significant difference between version A and 
B, this difference was in favor of two-factor-authentication. Students tended to perceive version 
A (two-factor-authentication) as more reliable than version B (blockchain-based) (Vysna, 
2020). However, we were able to retrieve from literature that transparency of online voting 
systems and familiarity with the utilized technology are key enabler of trust, which is supported 
by our focus group findings. Students agreed that blockchain enhances transparency which 
verifies the technology’s potential for being applied in online voting. 
Therefore, we concluded that people have to become more familiar with blockchain 
technology to be able to trust its application. The right way to achieve a widespread technical 
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understanding seems to be educating the population ahead of time. Future research should use 
our findings to set up an experiment, using a representative sample and effective education 
methods, to fundamentally approve blockchain’s potential in driving the trustworthiness of 
online voting systems. In times of decreasing turnouts of parliamentary elections and a 
dangerous shift to the right in global politics, the importance of finding effective ways to engage 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of seven existing blockchain-based online voting systems 
Name Founded Funding Real Life Experiments Blockchain Technology 
Encryption 
















Nothing published up 
until the end of 2019. 





No encryption for 
the votes. 
Provides long-term privacy 
because no encryption for the 
votes is used which could be 
decrypted by quantum 
computers in the future. First 
Voting DAC of the industry. 
Service requires the purchase of 
FollowMyVote tokens called VOTES. 
Their value is estimated to increase over 
time since there is just a limited amount 
and they will get destroyed after their use. 
Token holders, such as FollowMyVote 
itself and investors benefit from the 
















within the token-based 
investment platform 
Swarm. Ran a 24 hours 
stress test, processing 1.5 
billion votes in that time. 
Combination of a 
public version of the 
Ethereum blockchain 
and an Inter Planetary 
File System (IPFS) in 
order to store the 
votes. 
Ballot encryption is 






SecureVote developed their 
own algorithm called 
‘Copperfield’ to provide secret 
ballots. It’s also possible to 
obtain a receipt for a different 
vote to solve the coercion 
problem. 
SecureVote is not offering their services 
for everyone but individual clients. They 
are especially targeting to optimize 
governance structures within 
cryptocurrencies and tokens by enabling 







Series A Funding 






including general state 
elections, labour union 
polls and the currently 
biggest blockchain 
powered election with 
1.8 million counted votes 
for the Rock and Roll 
Hall of Fame.7 




In the future they are 
targeting a hybrid of a 
public version of the 
Ethereum blockchain 






Votem offers a fully 
customizable product which 
depends on the needs of the 
customer. They can pick any 
combination of features for their 
specific election. The cost 
structure adjusts accordingly 
which also enables smaller, less 
complex elections to use the 
application for reasonable costs. 
Votem introduced the VAST token which 
is required to use the service. Tokens can 
be used for multiple elections but not 
simultaneously. The most basic election 
requires just one token. The more features 
the voting authority wants to implement 
and the more complex an election gets 
(voter authentication etc.) the more tokens 










powered by the 
Kaspersky Lab. 
Several successfully 
supported elections in 
cooperation with 
universities, conferences 
and the government. The 
biggest use-case counted 
more than 82,000 votes. 
Private version of the 
Ethereum blockchain. 
ElGamal encryption 
for the votes. 
Up to 100 voters, Polys can be 
used free of charge. The website 
provides previews of the 
election on different devices and 
the possibility to choose 
between several voting methods 
and voter access points. 
The project got created by Kaspersky Lab. 
They offer a free plan called ‘Basic’, 
which allows to create an unlimited 
amount of elections and polls with 100 
votes per election. The commercial Pro-
Version enables more features such as 
rebranding the service and white-labeling. 
Prices vary based on request. 
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Name Founded Funding Real Life Experiments Blockchain Technology 
Encryption 








$ 9.3 million 
while a majority 
of the funding 
was raised during 
a Series A 
funding round in 
June 2019 led by 
Medici 
Ventures.11 
Within the municipal 
public elections in 
Denver 2019, over 4,000 
international voters were 
allowed to vote with the 
Voatz mobile app. 
24 counties of West 
Virginia used Voatz for 
Midterm General 




blockchain software.  




refers to encryption 
technologies several 
times but does not 
mention any 
specific algorithms. 
Voatz is leveraging biometric 
information (fingerprints, face 
id), provided by modern 
smartphones for the 
authentication process. 
The mobile application is just available by 
invitation of Voatz’s election organizer 
and not for the general public. The app 
primary aims for the transformation of 
public elections while making a profit out 
of it. Voatz did not publish any source 
code and does not provide information 
about prices without requesting an offer 










Agora has not 
published any 
funding yet but 
promoted the 
ICO of its VOTE 
token in mid 
2019 which could 
help them raise 
up to $20 million. 
First support ever of a 
national government 
election by blockchain 
technology. Parts of the 
Presidential Elections 
2018 in Sierra Leone 
were registered and 
processed by the Agora 
system.14 
Hybrid of private 
version of blockchain 






Agora developed a five-layer 
model for their application with 
innovative combinations of the 
public Bitcoin blockchain and 
their self-created permission 
blockchain called ‘Skipchain’ 
which allows verifying blocks 
and transactions without the 
need of a complete copy of the 
blockchain. 
Based on a formula containing average 
blockchain network fees and the election 
population, a dollar amount of VOTE 
tokens is purchased and form a bonus 
pool. This pool will be distributed between 
permissioned and permissionless 
blockchain nodes (which are VOTE token 
holders) after the election. These costs 
represent Agora’s profit and have to be 













Raised $ 1.1 
million by the 




They supported a 
leadership election with 
4,500 members of the 
Opportunities party New 
Zealand and an election 
of the Southern 
Australian government 
with 1,450 participants. 
Public version of the 
Ethereum blockchain. 
The whitepaper 
does not provide 
any sort of 
encryption methods 
in order to 
anonymize ballots. 
The idea of Horizon State is 
more focused on creating a 
decision-making ecosystem. 
While doing so, they work on 
many ‘secondary’ applications 
which customers can use next to 
voting. 
Horizon State aims to create a platform 
where customers can use their service by 
paying with Decision Tokens. These can 
be purchased by Horizon State or over a 
marketplace they provide. The supply of 
tokens will decrease over time and a small 
percentage of the costs for the elections 
will be donated to governmental and non-
profit projects by Horizon State. 
  
 
1 (Ernest, 2014)  2 (Crunchbase n.d.a)  3 (Varghese, 2017)  4 (Jackson, 2018)  5 (Votem, 2017b)  6 (Pitchbook, n.d.)  7 (Votem, 2017a)  8 (Polys, 2017)  9 (Dotson, 2017)                                               
10 (Moore and Sawhney, 2019)  11 (Crunchbase, n.d.b)  12 (Agora, 2015)  13 (Wu, 2018)  14 (Agora, 2018)  15 (Fenton, 2019)  16 (Horizon State, 2017)  17 (Crunchbase, n.d.c) 
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Appendix 5: Votechain’s first stage of the voting procedure 
 
  








*Where the user will be directed to after the sign in with Google depends on his voting status. If the
user voted already, he or she will get directed to the verification page. In case the user has not 
casted a vote yet, he or she will be directed to the voting page.
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Appendix 6: Votechain’s second stage of the voting procedure (using version A) 
 
  






*Users who already voted and sign in with Google again, get directed straight to the verification
page. In this case the verification page does neither contain the ‘thank you for voting‘ banner, nor
provides the password (the page in this case starts at **). Users are still able to verify their vote and














*Users who already voted and sign in with Google again, get directed straight to the verification
page. In this case the verification page does neither contain the ‘thank you for voting‘ banner, nor
provides the password (the page in this case starts at **). Users are still able to verify their vote and





Appendix 8: Information about the properties of one block/vote of Votechain 
 
 
Appendix 9: Survey questions 
Note: Answers to questions 1-25: Strongly agree; Agree; Somewhat agree; Neither agree nor 
disagree; Somewhat disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree 
 
Block 1 – Trust in specific technology construct: 
Reliability sub-construct items: 
Q1. NOVA's voting application is a very reliable piece of software.  
Q2. NOVA's voting application does not fail me.  
Q3. NOVA's voting application is extremely dependable.  
Q4. NOVA's voting application does not malfunction for me.  
Functionality sub-construct items: 
Q5. NOVA's voting application has the functionality I need.  
Q6. NOVA's voting application has the features required for casting a vote.  
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Q7. NOVA's voting application has the ability to do what I want it to do.  
Helpfulness sub-construct items: 
Q8. NOVA's voting application supplies my need for help through a help function. 
Q9. NOVA's voting application provides competent guidance (as needed) through a help 
function.  
Q10. NOVA's voting application provides very sensible and effective advice, if needed.  
 
Block 2 – Trust in general technology construct: 
Faith in general technology sub-construct items: 
Q11. I believe that most technologies are effective at what they are designed to do.  
Q12. A large majority of technologies are excellent.  
Q13. Most technologies have the features needed for their domain.  
Q14. I think most technologies enable me to do what I need to do.  
Trusting Stance towards general technology sub-construct items: 
Q15. My typical approach is to trust new technologies until they prove to me that I shouldn’t 
trust them.  
Q16. I usually trust a technology until it gives me a reason not to trust it. 
Q17. I generally give a technology the benefit of the doubt when I first use it. 
 
Block 3 – Institution-based trust: 
Situational Normality sub-construct items: 
Q18. I am totally comfortable working with online elections systems.  
Q19. I feel very good about how things go when I use online elections systems. 
Q20. I always feel confident that the right things will happen when I use online elections 
systems. 
Q21. It appears that things will be fine when I utilize online elections systems. 
Structural Assurance sub-construct items: 
Q22. I feel okay using online elections systems because they are backed by vendor 
protections. 
Q23. Product guarantees make it feel all right to use online elections systems. 
Q24. Favorable-to-consumer legal structures help me feel safe working with online elections 
systems. 
Q25. Having the backing of legal statutes and processes makes me feel secure in using online 
elections systems. 
 
Block4 – Demographic and other questions: 
Q26. What is your nationality? 
Q27. What is your age?  
Q28. What is your gender?  
Q29. What is your ethnicity?  
Q30. What program are you enrolled in?  
Q31. Please provide your email below so we can contact you in case you win the lottery: 
Q32. Would you potentially like to participate in a focus group study or do you want to learn 









Appendix 10: Transcription of the focus group 
Researcher 1: Welcome guys. Thanks for your time. We appreciate it a lot. So, this is going to be a 45min discussion. We are very interested 
in your opinion and your feedback in the voting which took place two weeks ago. We designed the whole system and it's very important to us. 
We really appreciate your feedback on this, so we can include this in our thesis as well. So let's go through some information which we have 
to go through so everybody is informed. So, just that you know, this whole thing is going to be anonymous. So none of your names will be 
anywhere and we will not track anything you said and connect it to your names. Also the tape if you're all okay with this, we would record this 
transcript, so we know what each of you said and then the tape will be delete. So, there's no voice of you or speech of you anywhere. Also if 
we include some options or something what you said, this will also be anonymous. So feel free to mention your real opinion, since you don't 
need to be afraid to be mentioned anywhere. So just some rules, so that we will have a smooth discussion. I will ask some questions about your 
experience with the system and then it would be really nice if everybody can mention their opinions.It would be nice if everybody could wait 
until the person stopped talking, so that we will not have interruptions. There is no right or wrong answers. It's all up to you. It's fully okay and 
we would even like to see if somebody has a totally different opinion than somebody else. Please feel free to refer to something others said. 
Somebody tells an opinion and you don't agree at all, so feel free to state this. Feel also free to state rally what you think although the rest of 
the group thinks differently. That's really appreciated. I think we went through all of the instructions. Any questions or concerns with that? 
Everyone feels comfortable with the situation? Great. Alright. I'm just gonna start by introducing myself or us and then I would be very happy 
if you state your name, nationality, degree as a small start up. Then like I said we will go through some questions if you even remember your 
experience from two weeks ago. 
I'm Ivo, Master of Management student, that's Nine and Kevin, Master of Finance students and Andrew our professor who is supervising our 
master thesis.We teamed up for the master thesis and in the course of our master thesis we built this voting system and ran an experience two 
weeks ago. We were happy and obliged of the school that they actually allowed us to ru this experience. May you can start with saying one 
sentence about yourself. 
Subject 1: My name is Subject 1 and I'm also a Master of Management student. 
Subject 2: I'm Subject 2 and I'm in my second year of my Bachelors of Economics. 
Subject 3: I'm Subject 3. Masters in Finance from Austria. 
Subject 4: I'm Subject 4. Also Masters of Finance student and I'm from Austria as well. 
Subject 5: I'm Subject 5. Also Masters of Finance student and also from Austria. 
Subject 6: I'm Subject 6, Master's in Finance and I'm Portuguese. 
Subject 7: I'm Subject 7. First year of Master in Finance and from Italy. 
Researcher 1: Alright, perfect. Pretty diverse group with a slight edge to Austria.So let's have a look at the application again in order to refresh 
your memory on how the voting looked like. So you should have got to a page like this. Then there was your degree and your election displayed. 
Then you selected your candidate and voted. Then you were redirected to the second webpage which looked something like this. Now comes 
the most relevant part. You were directed to some blockchain picture like this. Does everyone remember this?  
*Everyone agreed* 
Perfect. So you saw, hopefully you got this already at this moment, we will figure out soon, but you should have been able to see this whole 
blockchain. So each of those blocks was one vote and you should have been able to transparently see in fact the whole election in an encrypted 
way. Then you were directed to this step where you were able to verify your own vote. Finally, you were coming to the survey. This is just an 
introduction, so everyone knows what we are talking about. I would jump in with the first question. 
Question 1: Did you have any experience before with online voting systems. What's your general attitude or relationship with online voting 
systems. It's also fine if you never actually thought about this but what's your general attitude? Does anybody want to share any thoughts on 
this? 
Subject 4: So I guess it would allow more people to actually vote. For example, if you implement it as a national wide election and implement 
an online system I would think it would encourage people to vote. Because right now it's only 50% or 60% of which usually go to vote. I think 
it would motivate people to participate more. 
Researcher 1: Would you personally be enforced to participate more? 
Subject 4: I do anyways. But yes I think it would make the process easier. 
Subject 7: Probably without the proper knowledge of the technology of blockchain not everyone will be encouraged to vote. I mean someone 
who doesn't know how this kind of voting app works, especially the older ones, are not so encouraged. 
Researcher 1: Does it apply for you as well, actually? 
Subject 7: No I was trying to understand blockchain a while ago. So I was quite informed about it. 
Researcher 3: But this is for blockchain specifically or online elections in general? 
Subject 2: I think that this is a really good option for smaller elections like this one. For this one it is the best because we don't need a table in 
the main hall, signing three papers to put a small cross, in this case we only had one list, so it's more like a formality. So for this it is the best 
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system. I don't think it can be used in larger elections like national ones. Not just because the problem of older problem. That's also true but 
also because I think people won't feel safe enough voting for such an important thing as national elections online. 
Researcher 1: Would you personally feel safe? 
Subject 2: No. Personally, in my opinion I wouldn't feel safe. I know that the system that we use now, at least in Portugal that's the one I know, 
is a little bit old fashioned of course. Putting the paper in a black box but I feel safe to do that. I know that will be counted four or five times 
from different people right on the day. Then a few days after the votes are checked again. So, I know it's old fashioned and costs a lot of money 
but the vote will actually be counted as it is. In the online system for small elections like here, nobody will try to hack the system. It's not worth 
it. But in a large election it can happen.  
Subject 5: I actually share your opinion. It's simply easier to understand the old fashioned system we have right now. Mostly it can't be rigged 
and I understand this. But I don't understand blockchain and how it works. Of course, nobody should be able to rig it but because I don't 
understand it, I don't trust it. 
Subject 1: I basically disagree with it. I don't have any deeper understanding of it. But someone explained me how blockchain is actually 
working and I think also for big votings, like for the EU where we had a traditional system, even there were problems with some votes. I think 
the blockchain method might be even better for elections like this. I mean I don't have data but the risk of losing votes is even less because in 
the EU election where they counted the votes traditionally, they also had miscounted votes. 
Researcher 1: So you would be happy for the next government election in Germany for example if they come up with some online system? 
Subject 1: Definitely. 
Subject 6: I think it's all about transparency. I know blockchain, so there was no problem with it and I felt fine with it. I thought it was secure. 
But some of my friends were like "I don't know how it actually works. So how can I know it will be safe". People won't search for knowledge 
about it. So, I think you need to educate people. 
Question 2: Researcher 1: So you actually helped me to make the transition to the next question. So the next thing we were interested about 
is, do you think that as you mentioned transparency is crucial, important or does it even affect your attitude towards online voting? Or does it 
have no relationship with it? Is there anything transparency can make it more likely for you to participate in online voting or make you feel 
secure with it? 
Subject 3: I think that's pretty much the key to implement online voting in any election. That's also the only or one of the big advantages 
compared to traditional voting. Because there you also don't have the transparency of the people who are actually counting the votes. That 
might be the key to actually be able to convince people to trust it. But I also agree with other points raised where there might be hesitation for 
many people to use it. But it might also be the case it's getting more people to take part in elections compared to traditional voting. 
Researcher 1: Any other views on this? 
Subject 7: Transparency is the key requirement for voting. Not only for online voting. 
Researcher 1: So that means if there would be a system which is 100% transparent, you would definitely be more likely to participate? 
*Everyone agreed* 
Subject 1: I think blockchain is ensuring transparency even more than people who are counting the votes because as a normal citizen you don't 
observe them and count with them and checking if they are doing the right job. But if you have blockchain technology, everyone knows how 
it's working and can see online everything is saved, it's even more transparent. 
Researcher 1: Do you guys agree with this or do you think it's more transparent if we stick with the paper ballot system for example? 
Subject 5: I think it would be more transparent if you change to blockchain. Because you guys did it that everyone can check their vote. When 
I put in my code, I didn't really understand what I'm seeing but if you're explaining the people what the information actually means I thought 
it's really cool that you were able to see your own vote. So, if everybody could do that, I think it's transparent. 
Subject 4: It's just like a list of 10 million voters in a country. Then you can see anonymously this code voted for this candidate or party or for 
some specific cause. I think it's definitely more transparent. 
Subject 3: But then it's still just something virtually that's displayed and not an actual ballot you can have in your hand. I feel like you have to 
get to a point where people actually trust the transparency you are promoting and that's the tough part. 
Subject 7: I actually have a question. Blockchain technology is what's in between you and the candidates. So it cannot be hacked. But what 
about the mobile phones, for example? That's the most vulnerable point right? I mean the blockchain is trustworthy but the actual device is not 
that safe right?  
Researcher 2: It's definitely a point of attack. The device you are actually entering the vote is the most vulnerable part of the whole system. 
Once it is on the blockchain and it's distributed, the security is really high. But the individual devices are definitely a point of attack. 
Question 3: Researcher 1: So, thanks again for facilitating the transition to the next question. Talking about blockchain, the next question 
would deep dive into the technology. What's your opinion about blockchain in general? Some of you already mentioned you didn't understand 




Subject 6: I would say I kind of have an advanced knowledge. I know how the network with all the nodes works. I know what happens when 
you just try to change information on one of them, how hashed are created and that it creates a great layer of security. 
Researcher 1: What about the others? 
Subject 4: More or less the same. I would say a bit less based on the programming course at University. 
Subject 2: I didn't know anything about it. At the time that I was voting, I really didn't get the point of what it is and spent like 10 seconds on 
what it is and skipped through. It is not about my vote, just let me go. But I just realised right now, based on your explanation, what it is. 
Thinking about what you are saying about it right now, made me realise what blockchain actually it is. 
Researcher 1: Anybody else wants to share their knowledge about blockchain? 
Subject 1: The only thing that is in my mind, is that it's more secure. I think it's really difficult to hack and I rather trust a system that is really 
difficult to hack than a human being taking over my vote. 
Researcher 1: If nobody wants to add anything to this, we would more specifically go towards our or your voting experience, respectively with 
our system. So probably, let's start with summarising with everything you said so far. Where you in fact confident that the system cast your 
vote correctly as it was supposed to be casted?  
*Everybody raised their hand* 
Subject 6: The verification at the end made me feel more confident about my vote actually being casted correctly. 
Subject 1: I totally agree. 
Researcher 4: Can everyone raise their hands who actually verified their vote? 
*6 out of 7 subjects raised their hands* 
Researcher 1 asked Subject 3 directly who did not raise the hand: But you were still confident that your vote was casted correctly? 
Subject 3: Yes. In this election, yes. 
Question 4: Researcher 1: Let's imagine exactly the same system for your next government election. Would you feel the same based on your 
experience? 
Subject 5: I just thought for a student representative election it's just not that important. Nobody would have an interest except the candidates 
and I don't think they would actually rig the election. But for a nationwide election, I wouldn't feel so confident right now. 
Researcher 1: So if I get you right, you only believed your vote was casted correctly because you thought the likelihood tries to hack the system 
is low? 
Subject 5: Right. 
Researcher 1: So, if you would participate in an election were the likelihood is higher, you would not trust the system? 
Subject 5: Yes, exactly. 
Subject 2: Yeah, I have the same opinion. I also thought it is completely safe and I also verified my vote. But it is just for this specific election. 
In a national one, I am absolutely sure I would not going to feel safe. Especially because there are more advantages in hacking the election 
than it has in this election. Also another problem is the thing that someone said earlier with the trust in human beings. Actually in our system 
right now, even if you can cheat something, you just do it in a specific polling station. And in Portugal you can vote in thousands of different 
paces. So even if you cheat somewhere it's just a very small percentage. With the system, it's just one system and even though it will be huge, 
it's one system for 10 million votes. If you can manage a way to enter this system, although it's hard, you have access not just to one thousand 
votes but 10 million. The damage can be in a large scale because of that. 
Subject 4: One question. Do you know if a blockchain has ever been hacked? 
Researcher 1: There are cases with bitcoin. Bitcoin's also work based on blockchain. There were some cases some years ago where some 
exchanges got hacked and attackers successfully stole bitcoins from them. In other words they hacked their accounts or wallets respectively 
and not the whole blockchain.  
Researcher 3: The difference here is important to say. They hacked a specific account and send bitcoins from one account to another basically, 
not the whole blockchain. Translated to our use-case it would be one vote. 
Subject 3: So they basically changed one single vote with huge effort? 
Researcher 2: Translated to our case, yes. 
Researcher 1: In other words you were not able to hack the whole (voting) blockchain but able to influence single blocks. In our case, there 
was one transaction/vote per block. Normally there are multiple transactions in one block and sometimes there were even able to change some 
transactions of one block. Considering the whole blockchain this is a considerably small part but still there should be mentioned. 
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Subject 1: Just one comment on that. Correct me if I'm wrong. If we would use the blockchain method for national elections, the more people 
are involved the more difficult it is to hack right? 
Researcher 1: Yes. That's a principal of blockchain. The more people or nodes participate in it the higher the amount of connected devices is 
and the harder it is to hack the blockchain. 
Subject 1: So, the more secure it would also be, no? So it would be the exact opposite of what we just said right? 
Researcher 1: True, but the bitcoin blockchain was considerably large at the point where people were still able to hack specific accounts as 
well. Talking about having a blockchain based election on a governmental level, there is probably the need for some kind of administration or 
technical adjustment in order to make it secure. 
Subject 7: In your system, who actually did the mining? 
Researcher 2: We actually had no miners in our system. Our system was based on the blockchain logic regarding the hash system and 
connection between all the blocks but it was distributed. We did not have miners in between all the nodes checking each block and nodes who 
are checking back and worth in order to get to a consensus. There was no need for miners in our basic version. If you would go to a larger 
scale, like a nationwide election, there has to be a consensus protocol! 
Researcher 1: We are already answering our next question. Maybe each of you could more specifically state, if you had any doubts about the 
system, what would have been the reasons for that? Are there any specific reasons creating doubts in the system or your doubts only connected 
to a use case of a much bigger scale like national wide elections? 
Subject 7: Only when the scale is larger. 
Question 5: Researcher 1: So we go on with a large, last question. Was it actually clear for you guys, at the very moment when you voted, 
that the whole system was based on blockchain technology including how votes were casted. 
Subject 5: No, I did not know. The guys told me later. 
Subject 6: From the moment on, when the hashed appeared I knew that it was Blockchain. And the experiment we conducted in class together 
with the professor before the election already gave me an idea. 
Researcher 1: So the visualization helped you to believe that it was actually based on blockchain? 
Subject 6: Yes, exactly. 
Researcher 1: Did for you, Subject 5, the visualisation help to understand that it's based on blockchain? 
Subject 5: No, seriously, I checked the code and I thought it would be my vote but I did not have any idea that it was actually blockchain. I did 
not have any background in blockchain technology. 
Subject 6: Well, it's also not something happening in the front end. It's something happening in the back. 
Subject 1: I only knew it because I was talking with you about it before. If we would have not talked about it I guess it would have been the 
same as for Subject 5. I still do not have any background. 
Subject 2: I also did not know that it was actually blockchain. 
Researcher 2: Did you spend time with the blockchain visualisations like scrolling through the votes or searching for your own vote? Or did 
you not use it at all? 
 
Subject 6: I just looked at it and swiped right and left and that's it. 
Subject 7: I checked how many votes there are. 
Researcher 3: Did you guys read the information that was written on the webpages or not at all? 
Subject 3: Yes, shortly. Well written! 
Question 6: Researcher 1: Okay, so another small question since we are good in time. So before everybody seemed to agree that transparency 
is a very good way to enhance trust in online election systems. So making the transition, do you think the blockchain usage can actually increase 
this transparency. Or does it not have any impact. 
Subject 2: I really think that it can help. Today, we do not have a lot of transparency. For example, in portuguese elections we have a lot of 
trouble with people who want to vote and live outside of Portugal. They have to go to the embassy, send a letter and it needs to include lots of 
bureaucratic documents like your citizenship card. So, it's a huge mess. So for example, a good way to start would be this case because people 
do not think that their votes are actually secure since they travel for miles between post office. So a good way to start getting more transparency 
would be here and then people will trust it and spread the word about it so that eventually everybody trusts it and is willing to use it. 
Researcher 1: If I understood you correctly you mentioned before that you would not be confident with having the whole system based on 
blockchain online voting. 
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Subject 2: Yes, exactly because in terms of transparency the current system works quite well. As a result, a good way to start deploying it 
would be in cases were transparency is not as good as it should be. So people are able to notice that the system works quite well and is really 
transparent even knowing that the technology has limitations and failures. If we can deploy it in these cases, we could also deploy it nationwide. 
I think that it will be easier to convince people to trust the system if they could already see that it has proven itself to work in a smaller sample 
instead of just saying: "And now everything is going to be online". 
Subject 3: I actually have a hard time imagining how you could prove to people that their online casted vote was actually counted correctly. 
You can say: "Blockchain did this and that" but people will still not believe you. 
Researcher 1: Don't you think that the transparent view on every single vote like it way embedded in our system helps to prove the correctness 
to people? 
Subject 3: You could literally put everything there. I think it helps but is not enough. 
Researcher 1: So you think that the current, paper-based system in which you do not know at all what happens with your vote after you casted 
works better in this regard. We thought that the blockchain-based approach in which you can at least see something about your casted vote 
would help. 
Subject 3: Absolutely. In the beginning, I thought that it has the potential to be more correct and transparent than human counting. But in 
traditional counting you still have different people with different political interests involved who control each other. I think it has potential to 
be involved in elections but I think it will be hard to convince people to trust it. Look at the digital impact in elections like the US presidential 
election or Brexit. That scares people. 
Research 1: Any other opinions on how blockchain can influence the transparency of online voting? 
Subject 7: Well, I'm thinking about older population. The difficulty is that they do not even know how to use an App. You can give them 
transparency but if they do not know how to use it, probably, they do not get it. 
Researcher 1: What about yourself? Does the online voting with the inclusion of blockchain feel more transparent that before? Or did it not 
affect your perceived transparency of the system? 
Subject 7: No, I mean I did not have the chance to use it a lot of times so it's hard to tell. I was trying to figure out what the answer would on 
a nationwide level. 
Researcher 1: Any others who want to share their opinion on this topic? 
Subject 5: Yes, I think that what Subject 2 said was quite interesting. You said that, when people are not in town then they also do not have the 
certainty that their vote is casted correctly since they have to use a more complicated process. So I think that if you want to make the transition 
to a blockchain-based voting system this would be a perfect way to start. Just explaining it to people so that people get more comfortable with 
it. Because right now when you are mailing your vote, you have no idea whether your vote was actually counted so I think this would be an 
interesting starting point. Also to convince people and show them the system's transparency. Not that everybody votes the same from the 
beginning on, but if you start with those people, I think that the small group together with the transparency of the system would help driving 
the acceptance of blockchain voting. 
Researcher 1: Okay, let's make a quick hand vote. Who thinks that blockchain increases transparency for online voting? Two out of seven? 
Subject 3: How do you define transparency in this sense? 
Researcher 1: We agreed on that transparency is actually important for your trust in the voting system. So just use your own definition of 
transparency in this sense and answer the questions accordingly.  
Researcher 2: Okay, now six out of seven. 
Researcher 1: Alright, I think we came to an end. Thank you so much for your participation guys, we appreciate it a lot! 
